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(ii) 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion in Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready 
Mix, Inc., et al (No. 20010276-CA), 2002 UT App 257, 53 P.3d 499, on August 1, 2002. 
Appellant Salt Lake County [the "County"] petitioned the Utah Supreme Court to issue a writ 
of certiorari regarding that opinion. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(5). The Supreme Court granted the County's petition for writ of 
certiorari by order dated November 1, 2002. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
UTAHCODE ANN. Sections 57-3-101; 57-3-102(1); 57-3-103 ("Recording Act") [Add. "B"]. 
OPINION BELOW 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion in Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready 
Mix, Inc., et. al (No. 20010276-CA) 2002 UT App 257, 53 P.3d 499, AFFIRMING the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees on August 1,2002 [ Add. "A"]. 
The Court of Appeals opinion is cited herein as "Op., Tf ". 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the court of appeals erroneously interpret Utah's Recording Act by adopting 
the so-called "apparent title " rule, by disregarding Utah case law interpreting the Act as 
requiring that a good faith purchaser be "without noticetJ of defects in a grantor's title, 
thereby encouraging fraud by allowing a buyer to obtain title to land from a "seller" who 
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does not actually own it? 
2. Should the Court of Appeals have determined as a matter of law that Metro West 
was on inquiry notice of a defect in its Grantor's purported title, and, therefore, was not a 
good faith purchaser without notice? 
3. Is petitioner Salt Lake County, the legal owner of the property when it was sold by 
the Tingeys to Metro West, at least entitled to remand for trial on the as yet unlitigatedfacts 
crucial to application of the newly declared st apparent title" rule? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. Nature of the Case: This case concerns a quiet title action commenced by the 
Appellant ["County"] in Third District Court regarding a parcel of land (referred to in the 
trial court record as "Parcel G") adjacent to the common Salt Lake County and Utah County 
boundary line near Interstate 15 (the "point of the mountain"). The County's action sought 
to quiet title to Parcel G in the County as its legal owner under a written instrument. 
Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment seeking title to Parcel G on three 
grounds: (a) Utah's Recording Act; (b) a claim by adverse possession; and (c) "equity and 
sound public policy"[R.80, 82, 94-94]. The trial court granted summary judgment to 
Appellees only under the Recording Act, and did not address the other two grounds asserted 
by Appellees. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. 
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2. Course of Proceedings Below: 
A. Civil action filed in Third District Court by County (Appellant) on or about 
February 10, 1999. 
B. Order by Honorable Sandra N. Peuler granting Appellee's motion for 
summary judgment February 26, 2001. 
C. Appellant's Notice of Appeal filed in Third District Court on March 15,2001 
from Order dated February 26, 2001. 
D. Utah Court of Appeals filed its decision below on August 1, 2002 [see, App.. 
"A"]. 
E. Utah Supreme Court granted Appellant's petition for writ of certiorari on 
November 1,2002. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
"Parcel G" is a parcel of about 15 acres, and part of a larger parcel known as 
"Government Lot 4," located at the Utah County-Salt Lake County boundary line near 
Interstate 15 at the "point of the mountain." Parcel G is the only portion of Government Lot 
4 that lies in Utah County. 
On August 6, 1878, the United States government conveyed all of Government Lot 
4 (including Parcel G) by a land patent to William Turner, who recorded his patent in Salt 
Lake County on September 23, 1878 [R. 195; Op., ^J2]. Turner then conveyed Parcel G to 
the County by warranty deed dated December 4, 1878. The County's deed was recorded 
- PAGE 3 OF 27 -
with the Salt Lake County recorder on December 21, 1878 [R. 195; Op. ^[2], but was not 
recorded at that time with the Utah County recorder. The land patent to William Turner was 
also of record with the federal Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") office in Salt Lake 
City. [R. 198, J^ 9]. The County's 1878 warranty deed from Turner was ultimately recorded 
with the Utah County recorder on June 17, 1998. [Op., %L]. 
The predecessor-in-interest of appellee Metro West Ready Mix, Inc. ["Metro"], 
Lamona Farms, purportedly acquired its interest in Parcel G from Dahrl and Roena Tingey 
[the "Tingeys"] by quit-claim deed, dated April 14, 1989. [R. 127; Op. f3]. Metro then 
received a warranty deed to Parcel G from Lamona Farms on April 12. 1991. 
At all relevant times, there was no chain-of-title evidence in the Utah County 
recorder's office regarding Parcel G showing that Metro's grantors, the Tingeys, had ever 
acquired any interest in the parcel prior to their conveyance to Lamona Farms. In fact, the 
Tingeys' names do not appear in the title records at all. [R. 197-198, Tffl 7, 10]1. Metro's 
principals accepted the Tingeys' quit claim deed without securing legal advice [R. 215,11. 
13-16], title insurance, a professional title examination and report [R. 217-220,11. 12-10], 
or any documentary evidence of a prior conveyance of Parcel G to their purported grantors, 
the Tingeys [id.]. 
II 
!This fact, which the County considers of profound significance to Metro's "good-
faith purchaser" status, was omitted in the Court of Appeal's recitation of "background" 
facts. Op.,ffi[2-4. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted Utah's Recording Act by adopting its 
so-called "apparent title" rule, which conflicts with well-settled law applying the Act, and 
encourages land fraud by allowing a buyer to obtain title to land from a "seller" who does not 
actually own it. The Court of Appeals' new rule is not supported by the legal precedent upon 
which the Court relied, and conflicts with the long established "without notice" test for a 
bona fide purchaser. 
Even if the Court's "apparent title" rule were otherwise sound law, there was no 
record evidence in this case to satisfy the "possession" prong of the Court's four-part test. 
The Court of Appeals should have held as a matter so law that the record facts in this 
case establish that Metro West was on "inquiry notice" of an actual or potential defect in its 
grantors' title, and failed to undertake a reasonable investigation to ascertain the validity of 
the grantors' title. 
In the alternative, Salt Lake County is at least entitled to remand for trial on the as yet 
unlitigated facts crucial to application of the newly declared "apparent title" rule. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted Utah's Recording Act ["Act"] 
by adopting the so-called "apparent title" doctrine, which conflicts with 
well-settled case law interpreting the Acty and encourages fraud by allowing 
a buyer to obtain title to land from a "seller" who does not actually own it. 
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A. The Court of Appeals' new rule is unsupported by legal precedent, 
and conflicts with the well-settled "without notice" test for a bona 
fide purchaser 
Utah's recording statute provides: 
"Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
A. the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith 
and for a valuable consideration; and 
B. the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded." 
UTAH CODE ANN., Sec. 57-3-1-103. Recordation of a real estate conveyance instrument 
merely imparts notice to subsequent third-party purchaser of a prior conveyance2. 
Recordation was never intended to create or convey title. It does not cure defects in titles, 
and is not required to make effective a land transfer as between the parties thereto3. 
Utah's Act provisions governing unrecorded instruments4 is a typical "race-notice" 
statutory recordation scheme, whereby a protected subsequent purchaser (i.e., "bona fide 
purchaser" or "BFP") must have taken his conveyance in good faith, for value, and without 
notice of two distinct matters: (a) the existence of a prior purchaser's competing claim of 
interest in the property; and/or (b) a defect in his grantor's title5. Throughout this case, both 
2See WILLIAM E. BURBY, REAL PROPERTY §130 (3d ed. 1965); RUFFORD G. PATTON & 
CARROLL G. PATTON, PATTON ON TITLES §6 (2d ed. 1957&Supp. 2000) 
3UTAH CODE ANN, Sec. 57-3-102(3). 
4UTAH CODE ANN, Sec. 57-3-103. 
5
 Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Wasatch Bank of Pleasant Grove, 734 P.2d 
904, 906 [n. 2] (Utah 1986). See also, Pender v. Bird, 224 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Utah 1950). 
- PAGE 6 OF 27 -
Metro West and the Court of Appeals have incorrectly focused solely on the first of these 
matters, i.e., whether Metro had notice of a competing claim to the property by the County. 
But the analysis of the Court of Appeals is entirely wrong-headed because it is the second 
of these matters, not the first, as to which Metro had notice. In this case, it is clear that Metro 
had "inquiry notice" of an actual or potential defect in its grantors5 title. 
The Court of Appeals' "apparent title" analysis ignores the problem of Metro's inquiry 
notice. In adopting a "third alternative approach" to the "good faith" element of the 
recording statute, i.e., its "apparent title" test, the Court of Appeals [Op., If 10] devised a four-
part test whose elements are: (1) relevant property title records are silent as to ownership of 
the parcel; (2) claim of title by the purported owner; (3) possession of the land by the 
purported owner; (4) lack of visible activity, signs or fencing on the land by the true owner 
that might indicate a competing claim of title [Op., fflf 13, 16]. But as applied here, the 
Court's new "apparent title" doctrine undermines the "without notice" concept historically 
inherent in BFP status. 
At first blush, the Court's "apparent title'Yule seems merely a reformulation of the 
"inquiry notice" test, except that instead of asking whether the purchaser is on notice of the 
existence of the true owner's interest, or of a defect in his grantor's title6, the "apparent title" 
6
 The "notice" element in bona fide purchaser (BFP) analysis includes both notice 
of a competing claim of title, and notice of a defect in the purported owner's title. See, 
Pender v. Bird, supra n. 4, 224 P.2d at 1059 ("It is only when a purchaser parts with 
money constituting the purchaser price in reliance on the title of his grantor, without 
(continued...) 
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test asks whether the purchaser "reasonably believed" that its grantor had sound legal title. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals' approach turns the traditional BFP analysis on its head. 
The Court of Appeals' reformulation seems to derive from "apparent authority" 
agency law in which a true owner allows an agent to deal with property in a manner which 
misleads purchasers about the true status of title. That doctrine is an estoppel principle which 
requires an affirmative or culpable "representation" by the true owner upon which a 
purchaser reasonably relies in order to deprive the true owner of title. In this case, there is 
no contention that Salt Lake County engaged in similar affirmative culpable conduct upon 
which Metro West could have relied. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the County had 
not posted signs or fences, and was not then conducting visible activity, on Parcel G when 
Metro accepted the Tingeys' quit claim deed. This approach creates the incorrect an 
dangerous implication that somehow, if a property owner has not made its ownership of land 
physically visible to the world, he may have inadvertently vested "apparent title" in 
whomever may choose to claim title to the property and attempt to sell it. This is unsound 
6(...continued) 
notice of any infirmity in his grantor's title, that the purchaser acts bona fides." 
(emphasis added). Accord, Oakland Hills Dev. Corp, v. Lueders Drainage Dist, 537 
N.W. 2d 258, 297 (Mich. App. 1995) (under recording act, "[a] good faith purchaser is 
one who purchases without notice of a defect in the vendor's title"). 
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jurisprudence7, bad public policy, and it is at odds with well established Utah real property 
principles. 
The "apparent title" doctrine developed by the Court of Appeals requires merely that 
in the absence of a record of the true owner's interest, it is only necessary that the purchaser 
"reasonably believe" that his grantor has legal title. But the cases cited and relied upon by 
the Court of Appeals actually neither adopt nor support such a doctrine. Thus, in Muller v. 
Hallenbeck, 19 Cal.Rptr. 251 (Cal.Ct.App.1962), the court does not discuss an "apparent 
title" theory at all, but merely recites the rule in California for a bona fide purchaser. In 
Montana Elec. Co. v. Northern Valley Mining Co., 153 P. 1017 (Mont. 1915), the court 
discusses the ordinary bona fide purchaser doctrine applicable to chattels, without mention 
of a distinct "apparent title" rule. In First Nat'l Bank of Plattsmouth v. Gibson, 84N.W. 259 
(Neb. 1900), the court vaguely refers to "apparent ownership"without discussion or analysis 
(84 N.W. at 260), and certainly does not purport to enunciate a distinct, new legal doctrine 
of "apparent title." Finally, in Smith v. Huff 164 S.W. 429 (Tex.Civ.App. 1914), the court 
mentions the phrase "apparent title"only in passing, without discussion (164 S.W. at 431). 
Hence, the cases cited by the Court of Appeals do not actually enunciate any recognized 
7This notion, implicit in the Court of Appeals new rule, would expose any absentee 
landowner to a risk of loss of title merely because his ownership was not visibly manifest 
via signs, fences, or physical activity on the land. Particularly in states like Utah, in 
which large expanses of land are privately held for future use or development, without 
obvious indications of current usage, the doctrine espoused by the Court of Appeals 
opens a huge door to fraudulent land transactions. 
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doctrine, standard, test, or rule of "apparent title." 
Even if the apparent title doctrine as articulated by the Court of Appeals existed as 
established law anywhere, the Court's new rule simply looks for factors suggesting that the 
purchaser reasonably believed that its grantor had title. The Act requires the purchaser to 
show that it had no notice of either the claim of the true owner or of a defect in the grantor's 
title, not simply that the purchaser reasonably believed that its grantor had title. Accordingly, 
the Court of Appeals' announced approach contradicts the plain language "good faith" 
requirements of the Recording Act. The chief problem with the Court of Appeals' approach 
is that effectively establishes a per se rule under which in order to lay a prima facie case, a 
purchaser need merely allege that he reasonably believed that his purported grantor had legal 
title - even if there is no public record supporting the grantor's claim. Then, the burden of 
proof would shift to the true owner to attempt to defeat the BFP status. 
Further, the "reasonable belief'factors upon which the Court of Appeals relied are 
inherently suspect. First, a purchaser cannot reasonably rely solely on the uncorroborated 
representations of its grantor, since that person by definition has a strong interest in assuring 
the purchaser of good title.8 It seems patently nonsensical to suggest that a "good faith" 
purchaser is one whom relies on nothing more than vague oral claims of a purported seller 
8
 See, e.g., O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 P.2d 770, 775 (1934)("[T]he 
informant is under a strong personal interest to misrepresent or conceal the real facts."). 
See also, Methonen v. Stone, 941 P.2d 1248, 1252 (Alaska 1997)(reliance on seller's real 
estate agent also is unreasonable, since such agent has an interest in selling the property). 
-PAGE 10OF 27-
when those claims are specifically not substantiated by county land title records. 
Second, mere possession of property does not necessarily establish title. Leasehold 
tenants have the right to possession, but not title. Third, conversely, absence of visible 
activity on land by its rightful owner does not necessarily indicate lack of title. For various 
legitimate reasons, a property's true owner might reasonably choose to leave his land vacant 
and inactive for extended periods. Such an owner should not be victimized by a new legal 
doctrine that may subject his title to a bogus claim by a buyer who is required only to say that 
he "reasonably believed" a third-party's claim of ownership, even though that claim - as 
occurred here - was not supported by county title records. 
Thus, the criteria established by the Court of Appeals incorrectly shifts the analysis 
from whether a purported purchaser had notice (either actual or constructive) of a competing 
claim of title or defect in a putative owner's title, to an analysis of whether a purported seller 
established his "apparent title" merely through making undocumented, uncorroborated and 
self-serving claims of ownership which the buyer "reasonably believed.". 
Here, Metro's grantors, the Tingeys, were never in the chain of title, and Metro was 
fully aware of this fact. Metro claims to have examined the title records in Utah County 
before the purchase, and found nothing supporting the Tingey's assertions of title. The lack 
of record title in the Tingey's, at a minimum, put Metro on inquiry notice of a possible defect 
in, or complete absence of, the Tingey's title. Hence, Metro was - by definition - not a 
purchaser "without notice." 
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In short, the Court of Appeals' "apparent title" approach to the recording statute 
creates a dangerous precedent which is unsound law and bad public policy. It effectively 
supplants the traditional "good faith" test, which is inherently fact-intensive and should 
therefore rarely allow for summary judgment, with a per se rule of law under which any 
claimant can make merely a minimal, superficial, and self-serving assertion that he took a 
deed in reliance on the "apparent" title of the grantor, without having to prove his actual 
good faith and lack of notice. The doctrine propounded by the Court of Appeals, will 
encourage fraud and destabilize land titles. 
B, Even if the Court's "apparent title" rule were otherwise sound law, 
there was no record evidence in this case to satisfy the "possession" 
prong of the Court's newly devised test 
The Court of Appeals implicitly found as a matter of law that Metro's grantor, the 
Tingeys, had possession of Parcel G, thereby satisfying the second element of its test for 
"apparent title." However, there was absolutely no record evidence before the Court by 
which it could find such possession. There was, in fact, nothing but the undocumented and 
unsubstantiated assertion by Metro' s principals that the Tingeys represented that the land had 
been in their family "since the turn of the century." The complete dearth of evidence 
supporting the Tingeys5 alleged claims was specifically pointed out to the Court of Appeals 
at oral argument: 
THE COURT: "Does the record tell us anything about how the Tingeys came by their 
interest, if any? In other words, was this a family that had lived on the 
land and worked it over the years or are these people from California 
who, as far as we know, never had anything to do with Utah? 
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MR. HANSEN: "Your Honor, that is the fundamental problem with this whole case. 
We have absolutely no knowledge of the purported claim of title by the 
Tingeys. The problem in this case is that the only information we have 
about the conveyance from Metro West at all is through Metro West. 
There is absolutely nothing in the Utah County records until April of 
1989 when the Tingeys conveyed this to [Metro West]. 
THE COURT: "Well, was some affidavit filed though in connection with the summary 
judgment from someone purporting to have knowledge of the Tingeys' 
interest that indicated that [they] had lived on the land and worked it 
and so on and so forth? 
MR. HANSEN: "No, your Honor, there was not. The on, the only evidence in the 
record before the trial court and that was the fact the testimony of 
(inaudible) farm who testified that at the time of the negotiation for 
purchase of this property there were representations made by the 
Tingeys to principals of [Lamona] Farms stating that... the property 
had been in the Tingey family since the turn of the century. Beyond 
that, there is absolutely no evidentiary record of any claim of ownership 
of title." 
Transcript, Oral Argument, August 1,20029 (attached as Addendum "C") p. 1,1. 23 to p. 2, 
1. 22. Later in oral argument, Metro's counsel argued that Parcel G 
"was purchased from the Tingey family. That was their farm. They 
grazed animals all over this property and had since the turn of the 
century 
Id., p. 11,11.4-7. In rebuttal, counsel for the County pointed out to the Court of Appeals that 
"[i]n that statement about the Tingeys being longstanding owners that 
if they were family farmers, that's the first I've heard of that. I only 
knew that were was a claim according to the deposition testimony that 
the property had been [in] the family for a number of years. As to 
having a farm house or as to having family farming operations there, all 
9The reported oral argument date on the transcript is incorrect. The actual date of 
oral argument was April 29, 2002. 
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of this is new, this is ... all testimony by counsel this morning ...." 
Id,, p. 21,11. 11-25. The "finding" by the Court of Appeals of the "possession" element of 
its apparent title test, was wholly unsupported by the record. In reality., Metro offered no 
evidence to the trial court suggesting any form of "possession" of Parcel G by their grantors. 
As Paul Richards, a principal of Metro, testified on deposition, Metro relied solely upon the 
"word" of the Tingeys that the property had "been in the Tingey family from the turn of the 
century." [R. 218,11. 12-22]. Relying on a purported owner's "word" is very different than 
having physical evidence of their "possession" of the land. Thus, even if the Court's 
"apparent title" rule is otherwise sound law, the Court erred in finding, without support in 
the record, that all the elements of its test were met. At a minimum, the Supreme Court 
should remand for further proceedings on the issue of the Tingey's possession of the land. 
II 
The Court of Appeals Should Have Determined as a Matter of law that 
Metro West was on Inquiry Notice of a Defect in its Grantor's Title, and, 
therefore, was not a Good Faith Purchaser Without Notice 
The Court of Appeals should have held as a matter of law that Metro's affirmative 
knowledge of the complete absence of any evidence of record title in the Tingeys from 
Metro's own review of the public records was, in itself, sufficient to conclusively place 
Metro on "inquiry notice" of a potential defect in the Tingeys' claim of title. A purchaser 
taking a deed with any notice of a defect in his grantor's title ipso facto cannot be a BFP 
"without notice." 
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As the Court of Appeals recited10, inherent to the Recording Act's "good faith" prong 
is the claimant's lack of notice of a competing claim or defect in its grantor's title11. There 
were numerous facts pointed out to the Court of Appeals by the County concerning Metro's 
good faith as a BFP, i.e., whether it was placed on "inquiry notice" of the Tingeys' lack of 
good title12. However, the Court of Appeals summarily disposed of the inquiry notice issue 
by reaching the quizzical conclusion that "the facts and circumstances requiring further 
inquiry do not arise from records unless a statute so provides." Op., |15. But the County 
never argued that Metro was put on inquiry notice by what the county records did contain; 
rather, Metro was put on inquiry notice of the highly dubious nature of the Tingeys' claims 
by what those records did not contain. 
There are two types of constructive notice in Utah that preclude a subsequent 
purchaser from protection under the recording statute. The first is record notice, which 
precludes a claim by a subsequent purchaser when, under the recording statute, the first 
claimant properly recorded his deed before the subsequent purchaser. 
The second type of constructive notice which will preclude a subsequent purchaser 
10Op.,f6. 
1
 though the "without notice" requirement is not found in the express language of 
the Utah Act, it appears to be an implied part of the "good faith"requirement. See, e.g., 
Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App 278, Tf24, 989 P2d 61, 69(Ut. Ct. App. 1999); BURBY, 
supra, §134 (3d ed. 1965); 66 AM JUR 2d, Records and Recording Laws, §163. 
12See Appellant's Reply Brief at pp. 7 - 11. 
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is "inquiry notice." In 1955 the Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake, Garfield & Western 
Railway Co. v. Allied Materials Co., 291 P.2d 883 (Utah 1955), articulated the standard by 
which a subsequent purchaser under the recording statute is deemed to be placed on inquiry 
notice. The court explained: 
"Means of knowledge and knowledge itself, are in legal effect, the same thing 
where there is enough to put a party on inquiry. Knowledge which one has or 
ought to have under the circumstances is imputed to him. When a party has 
information or knowledge of certain extraneous facts which of themselves do 
not amount to, or tend to show, an actual notice, but which are sufficient to put 
a reasonably prudent man upon an inquiry respecting a conflicting interest, 
claim, or right and the circumstances are such that the inquiry if made and 
followed up with reasonable care and diligence, would lead to the discovery 
of the truth, to a knowledge of the interest, claim, or right which really exists, 
then the party is absolutely charged with a constructive notice of such interest, 
claim or right. In other words, whatever fairly puts a person on inquiry is 
sufficient notice the means of knowledge are at hand; and if he omits to 
inquire, he is then chargeable with all the fact which, by a proper inquiry he 
might have ascertained." 
Id., 291 P.2d at 885 (quoting 39 AM JUR § 12, pp. 238-40). More recently, the Utah 
Supreme Court in First. Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, 966 P.2d 834 (Utah 1998) 
reaffirmed Utah's recognition of inquiry notice, and stated that "inquiry notice 'occur[s] 
when circumstances arise that should put a reasonable person on guard so as to require 
further inquiry on his part.5" Id., at 839 (citations omitted). "'Whatever is notice enough to 
excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to 
which such inquiry might have led. When a person has sufficient information to lead him 
to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it.'" Id. (citations omitted). 
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In many jurisdictions throughout the United States, inquiry notice arises from facts 
a purchaser is made aware of, or should be aware of, upon receiving a title report or 
performing a title search on property.13 
Thus, the Court of Appeals missed the whole point of the County's "inquiry notice" 
argument. The Court seems to have confused "record notice," the type of constructive 
notice that arises from public records, with "inquiry notice," a different form of constructive 
notice, which arises from facts and circumstances which would trigger further inquiry by a 
reasonable person. The County has never contended that inquiry notice arose from public 
records. Rather, it arose from certain facts and circumstances confronted by Metro before 
it purchased the property which would have excited the attention of a reasonably prudent 
13
 See, e.g., Richart v. Jackson^ 758 A.2d 319, 322 (Vt. 2000) (a diligent inquiry 
would have readily revealed the existence of a homeowners association declaration, 
which was discovered and disclosed in defendants* own title insurance report); Osterman 
v. Baber, 1\A N.E.2d 735,738-739 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (a failure to inquire further into a 
notice on the bottom of the title insurance report and to do a title search precluded 
purchaser from being bonafide); Rafferty v. District of Columbia Zoning Comfnx ttl A.2d 
191, 193 (D.C. 1995) (a PUD covenant, as well as the information purchases received 
from their title search on the property, constitute facts or circumstances reasonably 
sufficient to put a person . . . upon inquiry notice which, if pursued with proper diligence, 
would lead to the discovery of the actual condition of the title); Iwai v. StateA 884 P.2d 
936, 939 fn5 (Wash. Ct, App. 1994) (if a title search had bee made, it would have shown 
the State as the owner of the property; that information was sufficient to put plaintiff on 
notice she was proceeding against the wrong entity); In re Barnacle, 623 A.2d 445, 450 
(R.I. 1993) (record was sufficient to put title searchers on inquiry notice of mortgagee's 
interest); Simplot v. William C. Owens, M.D., PA., 805 P.2d 477, 480 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1990) (the description of a lienholder on a certificate of title was sufficient to place on 
inquiry notice anyone who saw the certificate or who obtained a title search). 
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purchaser to make further inquiry14. 
For example, the statements allegedly made to Metro by the Tingeys refusing to 
warrant their title, and delivering instead only a quit claim deed, should reasonably have 
placed a purchaser on notice that further inquiry regarding the integrity of the title was called 
for. The Tingeys5 quitclaim deed to Metro was nothing more than a "wild deed15,'' 
originating outside the record chain of title. This fact alone, to any reasonable, legitimate 
purchaser of real estate, would create genuine suspicion regarding the validity of the 
grantors' alleged title. 
The record in this case establishes that Metro had more than enough reason to 
undertake an appropriate inquiry with respect to the Tingey's claim of title, but failed to do 
so. Metro reasonably ought to have gone beyond the Tingeys' bald, unsupported claims, and 
required greater evidence of those claims. Metro utterly failed to make any reasonable 
investigation concerning the factual and legal underpinnings of the Tingeys5 claims, and took 
no reasonable steps to confirm the integrity of the estate it expected to receive from the 
Tingeys (such as title insurance, etc.). 
uId. See also discussion of inquiry notice, (Opening) Brief of Appellant, pp. 14-
19. 
15
 the Tingeys' purported quitclaim deed conveyance to Metro was a classic "wild 
deed," {i.e., "a deed from a person not in the chain of title, and therefore without any 
force or effect as far as conveying any interest..." (Music Service Corp. v. Walton, 432 
P.2d 334, 336 (Utah 1967))), because the Tingeys were not in the record chain of title to 
Parcel G. 
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Therefore, the Court of Appeals should have held that such failure amounted to being 
placed on inquiry notice. The necessary logical extension of such a holding is that Metro was 
not a BFP "without notice/' and that the underlying summary judgment in Metro's favor 
under the Recording Act was thus incorrect. 
Why is it crucial to a fair application of the Recording Act that all facts supporting a 
finding of inquiry notice be closely analyzed? The Recording Act has the startlingly harsh 
effect of trumping the title of a true owner by vesting title in one who innocently {i.e., in 
"good faith" and "without notice") paid value for land and was first to record his deed. Thus, 
a purchaser should not, as happened here, be permitted to hide behind the recording statute 
after having deliberately turned a blind eye to obvious indicia of title defects or competing 
claims. See, Pender v. Bird, 224 P.2d 1057,1059 (Utah 1950) ("the [recording] statute was 
not enacted to protect one whose ignorance of the title is deliberate and intentional"). 
Additionally, Metro failed to take even the most routine steps, recognized as standard 
precautionary measures in modem real estate transactions, to determine the quality of the 
Tingeys' claim of title. For instance: (1) Metro did not require the Tingeys to warrant their 
title; (2) Metro did not cause a professional title search to be performed; (3) Metro did not 
obtain title insurance; and (4) Metro did not seek legal counsel in purchasing Parcel G to 
examine and opine upon the quality of the Tingeys' alleged title. Therefore, Metro West had 
actual notice of the utter lack of any chain-of-title record to support the Tingeys' 
representations. Such lack of record support of the Tingeys' claims put Metro on "inquiry 
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notice" of an actual or potential defect in their purported title. Metro had nothing more than 
bald assertions of title from the Tingeys, found nothing in the Utah County property records 
to support these assertions, and did nothing further to determine their veracity. As an 
experienced commercial landowner, Metro fell so far short of the norms of basic, prudent 
real estate practice that its meager efforts to validate its prospective title raise - at a minimum 
- genuine issues of material fact as to whether it acted in "good faith" and "without notice." 
Further, the County presented evidence to the trial court through the affidavit of an 
expert title examiner, Lammert Veenstra, who found by a proper examination of the chain 
of title through the Utah County recorder facts which would have, through reasonable 
inquiry, put Metro West on notice of the Tingeys' lack of marketable title. See Aff. Veenstra 
[R. 197-199], ffif 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, and 14. Veenstra, finding no recorded patent to 
Government Lot 4, turned to BLM records in Salt Lake City which disclosed the U.S. 
government patent to William Turner, from whom Salt Lake County took its warranty deed 
to Parcel G (*V/.[R.198], f 9), and by also researching the title through the Salt Lake County 
Recorder, he found Turner's deed to Salt Lake County. Thus, his search led to discovery 
of the County's title, even though not recorded in Utah County. Veenstra added that a prior 
copy of the Utah County ownership plat for Parcel G contained a recorder's notation, "IN" 
("Important Notice"), intended to flag significant issues regarding title [R. 199, f 12]. 
Veenstra stated that a proper title examination would lead the examiner to conclude that Salt 
Lake County had the strongest claim to title for the property in question, id., % 15, and that 
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because of the title issues arising from the Tingeys' conveyance, a title insurer would not 
insure their grantee's title. [R. 199-200, % 16]. 
It is reasonable to infer from these facts that Metro West, when Parcel G was 
purportedly conveyed by the Tingeys, was (or should have been) alerted to the existence of 
significant title issues which they could have resolved through a title search of sufficient 
depth as to conform to the standards of the title insurance industry. 
But according to the record in this case, Metro West did not cause a professional title 
search to be performed, did not obtain title insurance, and did not seek legal counsel in 
purchasing Parcel G. Instead, its principal, Paul Richards, merely relied on a review of 
dubious depth and accuracy made by himself and his now deceased partner (they supposedly 
"checked with the county"(Depo. Paul Richards [R. 216-217], 11. 21-5)), even after having 
been told by the Tingeys of a discrepancy in the legal description which allegedly prevented 
the Tingeys from conveying by warranty deed [id., R. 216,11. 9-20]. 
In short, a reasonably competent and diligent title examination, such as that performed 
by a professional title insurer or title attorney, would have revealed the facts that (a) the 
Tingeys had no claim to Parcel G by a prior recorded conveyance to them and thus lacked 
insurable title, (b) the Utah County Recorder had flagged the Parcel G ownership plat as 
having one or more title issues, and (c) constructive notice of the claim of title by Salt Lake 
County existed in property records outside Utah County {i.e., the BLM). Aff. Veenstra, 
[R. 197-200], supra. Applying the "reasonably prudent purchaser" standard, these facts are 
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exactly the kind of "red flags" that ought to excite the attention of a person of reasonable 
diligence to the potential existence of outstanding title issues, and were more than sufficient 
to place Metro West on inquiry notice of a competing claim and/or defect in their purported 
title. 
However, the Court of Appeals failed to address these substantial "inquiry notice" 
facts, effectively determining Metro's "good faith" as a matter of law on the mere basis that 
"[n]o statute or Utah case requires a party to conduct investigation beyond the county [title] 
records unless the party has knowledge of certain facts and circumstances requiring further 
inquiry." Op, f^ 13. Thus, the Court reiterated the doctrine of inquiry notice, but failed to 
address whether such notice arose in this case from the absence of any record title evidence 
supporting the Tingeys' oral assertions. This ruling was fundamentally erroneous and, 
accordingly, this case should have been remanded for trial on the fact issues surrounding 
Metro West's status as a "good faith" subsequent purchaser, and whether the surrounding 
facts and circumstances placed Metro West on inquiry notice. 
It would be manifestly unjust to permit a claimant to secure title through a worthless 
deed or a straw man transaction with deliberate disregard to obvious title flaws, as against 
a competing claim based upon a valid but unrecorded conveyance, merely because he 
happened to be the first to record his deed. Such a result was never the intent of the 
recording statute, yet it is exactly the result that Metro West has obtained in this case. 
Through its affirmance of the summary judgment, the Court of Appeals creates a precedent 
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under which fraudulent property transactions, based on the flimsiest evidence of "reasonable 
belief," are legally sanctioned. The Court's "apparent title" rule, and its application of that 
rule in this case, amount to bad public and legal policy. 
V 
Salt Lake County, as the legal owner of the property when it was 
fraudulently sold by the Tingeys to Metro West, is at least entitled to remand 
for trial on the as yet unlitigated facts crucial to application of the newly 
declared "apparent title" rule. 
The Court of Appeals' decision establishes a novel doctrine of "apparent title"for 
protection of purchasers under the Recording Act, requiring that four elements be satisfied: 
(1) relevant property title records are silent as to ownership of the parcel; (2) claim of title 
by the purported owner; (3) possession of the land by the purported owner; (4) lack of visible 
activity, signs or fencing on the land by the true owner that might indicate a competing claim 
of title. Op., f 13. Yet in purporting to establish new substantive real property law, the Court 
of Appeals failed to remand this case to allow the parties to litigate their claims and defenses 
in light of the new four-part standard which the Court has posited. The unfair and absurd 
impact of the Court's decision is obvious: In effect, the Court has said, "We announce today 
the standards that should be applied in such a case, but we are not going to allow these 
parties to apply them." 
At a minimum, the case should be remanded for pre-trial proceedings consistent with 
the new law developed by the Court of Appeals. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted Utah's Recording Act by adopting the 
so-called "apparent title" rule, which conflicts with the plain meaning of the Act, and 
encourages land fraud by allowing a buyer to obtain title to land from a "seller" who does not 
actually own it. The Court of Appeals' new rule is unsupported by legal precedent and 
conflicts with the well-settled "notice" test for a bona fide purchaser. Even if the Court's 
"apparent title" rule were otherwise sound law, there was no record evidence in this case to 
satisfy the "possession" prong of the Court's test. 
The Court of Appeals should have determined as a matter of law that Metro West was 
on inquiry notice of a defect in its Grantor's title, and, therefore, was not a good faith 
purchaser without notice. 
Finally, at a minimum, Salt Lake County, the legal owner of the property when it was 
fraudulently sold by the Tingeys to Metro West, is at least entitled to remand for trial on the 
as yet unlitigated facts crucial to application of the Court of Appeals' newly developed 
"apparent title" rule. 
For these reasons, the County respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Court 
of Appeals' affirmance of the summary judgment for Metro, and reject the "apparent title" 
rule as applied by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court is, therefore, encouraged to 
either (a) hold that Metro was on such notice as a matter of law, and therefore was not a good 
faith purchaser for value without notice; or in the alternative (b) remand for further 
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proceedings consistent with the parameters of the Court of Appeals' "apparent title" doctrine. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
By: 
DON/HXNSEN 
Deputy District Attorney 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
Salt Lake County, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 
a Utah corporation; 
and Monterra Rock Products, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20010276-CA 
F I L E D 
August 1,2002 
ll 2002 UTApp 257 1 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Sandra Peuler 
Attorneys: 
Donald H. Hansen, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark Clements, Mark F. James, and Mark H. Richards, Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Orme. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
111 Salt Lake County (the County) appeals the trial court's grant of Metro West Ready Mix, Inc.'s (Metro) motion 
for summary judgment. The judgment granted Metro quiet title to Parcel G (the Property) on the basis that Metro 
was a bona fide purchaser (BFP) under Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102, -103 (2000) (the Recording Statute). We 
affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
1J2 In 1878, the United States Government conveyed the Property by land patent to William Turner. Turner 
recorded his patent in Salt Lake County, even though the Property is located entirely within Utah County. The 
Property's northern border is the Utah County/Salt Lake County line. In 1878, Turner conveyed the Property to the 
http://courtlink.utcourts.gov/opinions/appopin/metro.htm 8/1/2002 
County by warranty deed. The County immediately recorded the warranty deed in Salt LaKe uoumy, um u.w.w 
than 120 years passed before the County recorded the warranty deed in Utah County in 1998. 
1J3 Nine years before the County recorded in Utah County, Metro became interested in acquiring the Property to 
further its business interests. Metro principals approached the Tingeys, who were reputed to be the owners of the 
Property, and inquired as to the purchase price. The Tingeys represented that the Property had been in their 
family since the turn of the century, and a title search Metro conducted indicated that the Property had no record 
owner in Utah County. Furthermore, the Tingeys were in possession of the Property and neither the County nor 
anyone else had posted any signs or carried on any activities that would indicate that anyone other than the 
Tingeys owned the Property. The Tingeys conveyed the Property to Metro by quitclaim deed for $25,000 on April 
14, 1989. Metro promptly recorded its quitclaim deed in Utah County, and incorporated the Property into its gravel 
pit operations on adjacent land owned by Metro. 
1J4 Shortly after discovering the competing interests in the Property, the County filed an action to quiet title. Metro 
filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Metro was entitled to BFP protection under the Recording 
Statute. The trial court granted Metro's motion and this appeal followed. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
115 The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court correctly granted Metro's motion for summary 
judgment, holding that Metro is a BFP meriting protection under the Recording Statute even though the Tingeys 
never had legal titled to the Property. We review a trial court's summary judgment ruling for correctness, 
no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. See Peterson v. Coca-Cola U.S.A., 2002 UT 42,fl7, 446 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 27. Summary judgment is appropriate only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c). 
ANALYSIS 
1|6 The Recording Statute reads in part as follows: 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any subsequent purchaser of 
the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103 (2000). Although the plain language of section 57-3-103 does not specifically require 
that the subsequent purchaser take title without notice of prior conveyances, Utah courts have included this 
element as inherent in the good faith requirement. See Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33^(31, 44 P.3d 781; Johnson v. 
Higley, 1999 UT App 278,1124, 989 P.2d 61. Furthermore, this court has stated that the purpose of the Recording 
Statute "is not to make the transfer of property effective as between the parties, but to protect the purchaser's 
interest against the asserted interest of any third parties, and to inform third parties of the existence of pre-existing 
encumbrances on the property." Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014,1016 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted). 
However, the issue of whether a subsequent purchaser may obtain BFP protection when his or her grantor never 
had legal title to the property is an issue of first impression in Utah. We therefore begin our analysis by looking to 
other jurisdictions to find the rule most in harmony with existing Utah law. 
117 The County urges us to adopt a historic approach followed by many courts. Under the historic approach, 
The doctrine of bona fide purchaser without notice does not apply where the purchaser buys no title 
at all. If he buys from one who has title, and it should afterwards appear that, another had a better 
title which he had not recorded, or that there was a fraud in the title of which he had no notice, the 
purchaser would be protected. But this doctrine cannot apply where no title whatever existed in the 
vendor. The good faith of a purchaser cannot create a title. 
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Dodge v. Briqgs. 27 F. 160, 166-67 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1886) (emphasis omitted); see also Iowa Land & Trust Co. v. 
United States. 217 F. 11, 13 (8th Cir. 1914) ("The equitable doctrine of a bona fide purchaser without notice does 
not apply where there is a total absence of title in the vendor. The good faith of a purchaser cannot create a title 
where none exists."); Lindblom v. Rocks, 146 F. 660, 663 (9th Cir. 1906) (same); Kaiser Energy, Inc. v. 
Department of Envtl. Res., 535 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) ("It is axiomatic that a person cannot 
effectively convey property in which he has no ownership rights. The bona fide purchaser concept applies only to 
purchasers of legal title."); Cook v. Eller, 380 S.E.2d 853, 854 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) ("An individual cannot claim 
bona fide purchaser status if his grantor never had title to the property."). Therefore, under the historic approach, 
BFP protection does not apply when a grantor lacks legal title because "[the purchaser's] good faith cannot create 
title" where none exists. Lindblom, 146 F. at 663. 
fl8 However, as Metro points out, some modern courts have rejected the historic approach because of its logical 
inconsistencies when juxtaposed against the plain language of race-notice recording statutes that are similar to 
Utah's. For example, in Roberts v. Estate of Purslev, 718 A.2d 837 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998), the appellants had an 
unbroken chain of title back to 1854, whereas the appellees' chain of title was broken in 1901. See id. at 840. 
Despite the appellees' broken chain of title, the appellees' predecessor in interest recorded first. See id. 
fl9 Although appellants could trace their legal title to 1854, the court held in favor of appellees under the BFP 
doctrine. Based on the Pennsylvania recording statute, the court reasoned: 
If "legal title," within the Appellants'] definition, were required for a subsequent purchaser to qualify 
as a bona fide purchaser, the recording statute would not further its intended goals. For instance, in 
the typical recording statute situation, a grantor sells land to a grantee who does not record the 
deed; then, a subsequent buyer purchases the same land from the same grantor as the original 
grantee and this subsequent grantee records his deed before the first grantee. The subsequent 
grantee does not have "legal title" within the Appellants'] definition because at the time the land was 
sold to him, the grantor did not have legal title to give such right. Yet, notwithstanding the fact that 
he does not have "legal title," he is a bona fide purchaser if at the time of the sale he was without 
notice of an adverse interest and value was given for the purchase of the land. As evidenced here, 
imposing a requirement of "legal title" to the definition of a bona fide purchaser would nearly render 
the recording statute useless. We, therefore, find no merit in Appellants' argument. 
!dL at 841 (citations and emphasis omitted). Therefore, under this view, the historical approach is illogical because 
the traditional recording act hypothetical does not require the seller to have legal title in order for the subsequent 
purchaser to receive BFP protection. 
1J10 Despite the historical approach's logical inconsistencies, the County argues that reading the Recording 
Statute in the manner adopted in Roberts creates "absurd consequences" by contradicting the purposes of the 
Recording Statute and sanctioning fraud in land conveyances. See State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108,fl12, 992 P.2d 
986 (stating that courts avoid interpreting statutes in such a manner as to render absurd consequences). The 
County's argument is compelling because the Roberts rationale fails to acknowledge that the Recording Statute 
was not enacted for the purpose of making otherwise worthless transactions effective as between the parties. See 
Horman. 744 P.2d at 1016. However, the reasoning in Roberts exposes the flaw of the historical approach. Thus, 
both of the approaches heretofore discussed have logical and practical failings that make them inadequate to 
solve the question at issue in this case. For this reason, we examine the rationale of other courts in adopting a 
third alternative approach. 
1111 A number of courts have adopted the rule that a purchaser may obtain BFP protection if the grantor had 
apparent legal title, even if he or she did not have perfect legal title. See, e.g., Muller v. Hallenbeck, 19 Cal. Rptr. 
251, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) ("A bona fide purchaser is one who can prove possession of his grantor, the 
purchase of the property, and the payment of the purchase money in good faith and without notice, actual or 
constructive."); Montana Elec. Co. v. Northern Valley Mining Co., 153 P. 1017, 1018 (Mont. 1915) (same); First 
Nat'l Bank of Plattsmouth v. Gibson, 84 N.W. 259, 260 (Neb. 1900) (stating rule that purchaser acquires only title 
that his grantor had at time of sale, unless he bought and paid for property on faith of apparent owner, upon which 
he was legally justified in relying); Smith v. Huff, 164 S.W. 429, 431 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (holding that purchaser 
could not have BFP status because grantor never had actual or apparent title to land). 
1112 Courts that have adopted the apparent title rule implement the Recording Statute without sacrificing a plain 
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language reading. For example, in Montana Electric, the court defined a bona fide purchaser as: 
"One who at the time of his purchase advances a new consideration, surrenders some security, or 
does some other act which leaves him in a worse position if his purchase should be set aside, and 
purchases in the honest belief that his vendor had a right to sell, without notice, actual or 
constructive, of any adverse rights, claims, interest, or equities of others in and to the property sold." 
153 P. at 1018 (emphasis added) (quoting Foster v. Winstanley. 102 P. 574, 579 (Mont. 1909)). Thus, the 
purchaser must take title without notice that the grantor is in fact not the owner. 
1113 Courts applying the apparent title rule have analyzed several factors to determine whether the purchaser was 
without notice that the grantor did not have at least apparent title to the property. If the records are silent on 
ownership, courts have considered the following: (1) whether the purported owner claimed to own the property, 
seePenderv. Bird. 119 Utah 91, 224 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1950); (2) whether the purported owner possessed the 
property, see Aultv. Holden, 2002 UT 33,fi42, 44 P.3d 781; Muller. 19 Cal. Rptr. at 255; and (3) whether there 
was any activity or indication on the property that would raise questions as to who owned the property. See First 
Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 838 (Utah 1998) (stating party on inquiry notice where 
railroad poles, guy wires, and trolley wires on property subject to adverse claim). 
t[14 We adopt the apparent title rule because it harmonizes the purposes of the Recording Statute. First, by 
recognizing the need for a grantor to have at least apparent title to make a valid conveyance, the Recording 
Statute does not validate sham conveyances. Second, it protects purchasers whose honest belief that the 
purported owner owns the property is supported by legally significant facts. 
1J15 Applying the apparent title rule to this case, we conclude that the trial court was correct in extending BFP 
protection to Metro.^ To determine whether Metro was legally justified in its belief that the Tingeys owned the 
Property, the threshold question is whether the records were silent as to ownership. Metro contends the records 
were silent regarding ownership because the Utah County Recorders Office had no record owner listed for the 
Property. The County argues, however, that Metro had a duty to inquire beyond the Utah County records, and 
it done so, would have discovered that the Tingeys were not the owners. The Recording Statute states that if a 
document is recorded in the appropriate county, it provides notice to the world. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102 
(1) (2000). No statute or Utah case requires a party to conduct investigation beyond the county records unless the 
party has knowledge of certain facts and circumstances requiring further inquiry. SeeJohnson v. Hiqlev, 1999 UT 
App 278,1124, 984 P.2d 61. However, the facts and circumstances requiring further inquiry do not arise from 
records unless a statute so provides. See First Am. Title Ins., 966 P.2d at 839 (holding road maps on file in county 
clerk's office did not provide constructive notice). 
1J16 Since the Utah County records relevant to the Recording Statute were silent as to the owner, the apparent 
title approach requires that we address the secondary factors. First, the Tingeys asserted that the Tingey family 
had owned the Property since the turn of the century. Second, the Tingeys were in possession of the Property. 
Third, the County did not have any signs on the Property or carry out any activity that would lead Metro to believe 
that the Tingeys were not the owners. Therefore, applying this rule, Metro is entitled to BFP protection because it 
was legally justified in relying on the Tingeys' claims of ownership.^ 
CONCLUSION 
1J17 In sum, the trial court was correct in concluding that Metro was a BFP because Metro was legally justified in 
concluding that the Tingeys were the owners based on the lack of record evidence, the Tingeys' possession of the 
Property, and the County's failure to post signs or carry on any activity that would raise questions 
about the Tingeys' title to the Property. Accordingly, we affirm. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
8/1/2002 
1118 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. As used in this opinion, the term "legal title" means title superior to all others, based on real property legal 
principles other than the Recording Statute. It is also the term used in several of the opinions cited herein. 
2. It is undisputed that Metro purchased the Property for value and recorded first. The only issue we address in 
regard to Metro's BFP status is whether it had notice that the Tingeys did not have legal title to the Property. 
3. Because we affirm the trial court based on the Recording Statute, we do not reach Metro's adverse possession 
argument. 
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General Provisions 
57-3-101. Certificate of acknowledgment, proof of execu-
tion, jurat, or other certificate required — 
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— Validity of document — Notice of unnamed 
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57-3-104. Certified copies entitled to record in another 
county — Effect. 
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addresses required in documents. 
57-3-106. Original documents required — Captions — Leg-
ibility [Effective until July 1, 2002]. 
Original documents required — Captions — Leg-
ibility [Effective July 1, 2002). 
57-3-107. Unenforceable covenants — Definition — Inclu-
sion in recorded document. 
57-3-108. Financing statements not subject to title. 
Part 2 
Master Mortgage and Trust Deeds 
57-3-201. Definitions. 
57-3-202. Recording master mortgage and trust deed — 
Requirements for master form — Indexing by 
county recorder. 
57-3-203. Authorization to incorporate master form by ref-
erence — Referencing a master form — Pro-
hibiting the reference of legal descriptions. 
57-3-204. Constructive notice — Effect as between direct 
parties to mortgage or trust deed. 
57-3-1 to 57-3-12. Renumbered as §§ 57-3-101 to 57-3-
107. 1998 
PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
57-3-101. Certificate of acknowledgment, proof of ex-
ecution, jurat, or other certificate required — 
Notarial acts affecting real property. 
(1) A certificate of the acknowledgment of any document, or 
of the proof of the execution of any document, or a jurat as 
defined in Section 46-1-2, or other notarial certificate contain-
ing the words Subscribed and sworn" or their substantial 
equivalent, that is signed and certified by the officer taking the 
acknowledgment, proof, or jurat, as provided in this title, 
entitles the document and the certificate to be recorded in the 
)ffice of the recorder of the county where the real property is 
ocated. 
(2) Notarial acts affecting real property in this state shall 
ilso be performed in conformance with Title 46, Chapter 1. 
1998 
7-3-102. Record imparts notice — Change in interest 
rate — Validity of document — Notice of un-
named interests — Conveyance by grantee. 
(1) Each document executed, acknowlpdcr^H *T*A — ± : / 2 - J 
or certified copy of a document complying with Section 57-
4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of 
location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing 
statement complying with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not 
acknowledged shall, from the time of recording with the 
appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of 
their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change 
in the interest rate in accordance with the terms of an 
agreement pertaining to the underlying secured obligation 
does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the document 
provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document 
with respect to the parties to the document and all other 
persons who have notice of the document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nomi-
nal consideration, names the grantee as trustee, or otherwise 
purports to be in trust without naming beneficiaries or stating 
the terms of the trust does not charge any third person with 
notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any 
other person not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the 
interest granted to him free and clear of all claims not 
disclosed in the document in which he appears as grantee or in 
any other document recorded in accordance with this title that 
sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest 
claimed, and describes the real property subject to the inter-
est. 2000 
57-3-103. Effect of failure to record. 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void 
as against any subsequent purchaser of the same real prop-
erty, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property 
in good faith and for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly 
recorded. 1998 
57-3-104. Certified copies entitled to record in another 
county — Effect. 
Whenever a document is of record in the office of the county 
recorder of any county, a copy of the record of the document 
certified by the county recorder may be recorded in the office of 
the county recorder of any other county. The recording of a 
certified copy in the office of the county recorder of another 
county has the same force and effect as if the original docu-
ment had been recorded in the other county. 1998 
57-3-105. Legal description of real property and names 
and addresses required in documents. 
( D A document executed after July 1, 1983, is entitled to be 
recorded in the office of any county recorder only if the 
document contains a legal description of the real property 
affected. 
(2) (a) A document affecting title to real property presented 
for recording after July 1, 1981, is entitled to be recorded 
in the office of any county recorder only if the document 
contains the names and mailing addresses of the grantees 
in addition to the legal description required under Sub-
section (1). 
(b) The address of the management committee may be 
used as the mailing address of a grantee as required in 
Subsection (2)(a) if the interest conveyed is a timeshare 
interest as defined by Section 57-19-2. 
(3) Each county recorder shall refuse to accept a document 
for recording if it does not conform to the requirements under 
this section. 
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3 MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, that is the fundamental 
4 problem with this whole case. We have absolutely no knowledge 
5 of the purported claim of title by the Tingeys. The problem in 
6 this case is that the only information we have about the 
7 conveyance from Metro West at all is through Metro West. There 
8 is absolutely nothing in the Utah County records until April of 
9 1989 when the Tingeys conveyed this to (inaudible) . 
10 THE COURT: Well, was some affidavit filed though in 
11 connection with the summary judgment from someone purporting to 
12 have knowledge of the Tingey's interest that indicated that had 
13 lived on the land and worked it and so on and so forth or? 
14 MR. HANSEN: No, your Honor, there was not. The 
15 only, the only evidence in the record before the trial court 
16 and that was the fact the testimony of (inaudible) farm who 
17 testified that at the time of the negotiation for purchase of 
18 this property there were representations made by the Tingeys to 
19 principals of the (inaudible) Farms stating that the 
20 (inaudible), that the property had been in the Tingey family 
21 since the turn of the century. Beyond that there is absolutely 
22 no evidentiary record of any claim of ownership of title. 
23 There is certainly no judgment quieting title by adverse 
24 possession or otherwise to the Tingeys. So, the point of this 
25 entire exercise today is that there is nothing in the chain of 
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2 THE COURT: Well, they would have to take with notice 
3 that there was no title interest of record in the Tingeys. 
4 They've (inaudible) fact that notice, are they not? 
5 MR. HANSEN: We believe that is a correct statement 
6 and a sound reason, your Honor. Our position stated in brief 
7 is that at a minimum of the fact of an absence of (inaudible) 
8 title (inaudible) Tingeyfs suggested at least enough to excite 
9 this curiosity as to the integrity of the Tingey/rs title to 
10 place them on inquiry notice with respect to that title. 
11 We think an equally sound legal conclusion though is 
12 that beyond inquiry notice which is a form of constructive 
13 notice, they had actual notice that there was no title and that 
14 that was sufficient under the doctrine of Pender vs. Bird which 
15 was discussed in our reply brief at pages 6 and 7 that they had 
16 notice potentially of not only Salt Lake County's (inaudible) 
17 interest of this but they also had actual notice of the fact 
18 that there was at least a latent (inaudible) in the title that 
19 they purportedly took in 1989. 
20 THE COURT: But, but your position is that that's a 
21 question for the jury and that the jury could have easily, I 
22 assume, concluded that as Metro had at least checked the 
23 records in Utah County and found no record on that that was 
24 sufficient. 
25 MR. HANSEN: Our position on this issue is in the 
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1 We think that that was also additional material that would 
2 place a reasonable purchaser on inquiry notice, 
3 Third is that Metro West didn't bother to secure a 
4 title report or a professional title examination. There is 
5 nothing in writing with respect to an examination or research 
6 of the title. 
7 Fourth, that they did not secure title insurance. 
8 Fifth, that they did not secure an opinion of counsel 
9 or representation by counsel during the transaction process 
10 and, fifth, we think this is quite important, although it 
11 wasn't terribly well developed in our briefing, is that a 
12 gentleman named Lambert (inaudible) who is a professional title 
13 examiner whose affidavit accompanied the County's opposition to 
14 Metro West's motion for summary judgment at the trial level, 
15 conducted as part of the response of the County to the motion 
16 for summary judgment, a title search of parcel G beginning in 
17 Utah County, found no title history before the Tingeys which 
18 lead him then to determine what was the source of that title. 
19 Where does it go back to? So, what does he do, he goes to the 
20 Bureau of Land Management Office in Salt Lake, finds the 
21 original land patented (inaudible) of 1878 from the United 
22 States to Raymond Turner and that leads him in turn to 
23 determining, to a finding Salt Lake County's interest that was 
24 recorded in Salt Lake County. The point being that if a 
25 professional title examiner who had been running this case by 
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1 it is, this is the threshold question because adverse 
2 possession cannot be a basis for a claim of title against a 
3 government entity so long as there has been designation for a 
4 public purpose. 
5 In our review of the case law there is no case 
6 defining what is a public purpose although there are some 
7 examples of that in the statute itself. There is testimony in 
8 the record by a deposition that was taken by Metro West of a 
9 Roger Hillman who is the director of real estate for Salt Lake 
10 County indicating an intent, we believe that the testimony 
11 (inaudible) was at least sufficient to raise a material, 
12 genuine issue of material issue as to whether the County was 
13 holding the property for a public use. And the case cited in 
14 brief was Abert vs. Utah County Drainage District indicates 
15 that that is all that is required if it is being held for a 
16 public use and that there is a "foreseeable plan" to use it for 
17 public use and this is discussed in the reply brief of 
18 appellant's at Page 26. 
19 This is enough to create, we think, a triable issue 
20 of fact as to whether the County has designed the property for 
21 a public use because if it did, then the inquiry ends there. 
22 There can be no claim of adverse possession. 
23 But moving forward and treating the adverse 
24 possession claim that Metro West asserts in its brief, and let 
25 me just quickly discuss a couple of items. First of we think 
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1 county believed to be its property. 
2 With that, your Honor, I'll submit subject to further 
3 results. Thank you. 
4 THE COURT: May I ask before you sit down? 
5 MR. HANSEN: Sure. 
6 THE COURT: What statutory section it is that deals 
7 with adverse possession claims against the governmental entity? 
8 You referred to it (inaudible). I see one that's titled 
9 "adverse possession of public streets or ways". In §78-12-13. 
10 MR. HANSEN: That's the one, your Honor. That's it. 
11 Okay. But it also, it goes on to say "streets, 
12 lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares or for any 
13 other public purpose. And actually the testimony that I 
14 referred to by Roger Helem did discuss plans for a future park 
15 at that location. (Inaudible) Thank you. 
16 MR. CLEMENTS: Thank you, your Honor, may it please 
17 the Court. 
18 Just initially in response to Judge Orem's question 
19 about (inaudible) . The record at pages 102 and 104 through 105 
20 discusses, and it is brief, but Tingey's representations. They 
21 are long standing owners of property in Utah County and have 
22 lived there all of their lives. They passed away prior to this 
23 suit being initiated. If you recall that map that was up at 
24 the beginning, the Tingey's owned almost all of that property 
25 J or quite a bit of it and Dr. Richards and Dr. Nelson - at the 
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1 title company. They went to the title company and said this is 
2 what we understand, this what the Tingey's (inaudible), we 
3 bought all this other property but on this one piece of 
4 property they only give us a Quit Claim Deed because of this 
5 variance. The title company went and researched the records 
6 and came back and told Dr. Richards "We don't find anything 
7 that conflicts with what the Tingeys are telling you. It's 
8 true that the record isn't clear. It doesn't show ownership in 
9 any party but it certainly doesn't show ownership in anybody 
10 else and we find that, yes, that's correct about this 1,000 
11 foot variance and, yes, it's correct the Tingeys own all this 
12 other property in the area and it's been in their family." 
13 There was nothing else, there were no other records that Dr. 
14 Richards and Dr. Nelson could turn to that would indicate any 
15 other ownership. Now, they dumped the property -
16 THE COURT: This price seemed a little low as though 
17 maybe reflecting that someone was kind of taking their chances. 
18 I guess both the giving of a Quit Claim Deed - aside from the 
19 variance. I mean if you just looked at this without some of 
20 the background you would assume that both the low purchase 
21 price and the Quit Claim Deed suggested you had a buyer that 
22 was sort of taking his chances. 
23 MR. CLEMENTS: I think, Judge Orme, that the purchase 
24 price wasn't low. I think Dr. Richards will tell you that. 
25 That is the same price that they were buying all of the 
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1 ownership in it. The only indication on the property itself 
2 was that it belonged to the Tingey's. There was no signs, 
3 nothing, posted, nothing. So, in an inspection of the property 
4 there was nothing that would have given inquiry notice of any 
5 problem. In fact the -
6 THE COURT: I guess the question is given that there 
7 was nothing in the Utah County Records at the County Recorder's 
8 Officer of anyone having title to this land, was that 
9 sufficient to, as in the Pender case, to excite their curiosity 
10 and create a duty to check further as their expert said that, 
11 you know, they could have easily gone to the BLM reference and 
12 discovered a chain of title by doing that. 
13 MR. CLEMENTS: Yeah, I think that -
14 THE COURT: And that's normally a jury question, it 
15 seems to me, the good faith. 
16 MR. CLEMENTS: In that First American Title case that 
17 was the issue that was brought up. I think it was summary 
18 judgment (inaudible) . The case was, the issue was brought up 
19 should they have looked further and the court said no, notice 
20 doesn't come from records because it was the same thing, the 
21 plaintiff in the case had said we didn't file it in the right 
22 place but if they had looked over at some additional county 
23 records they would have found our interest and the court said, 
24 no, you looked at the Statute or you looked at the county 
25 I recorder's office and the records kept there and if there isn't 
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1 anything that would have peaked your curiosity that the county 
2 had an ownership interest? Metro West - or Dr. Richards knew 
3 that he was only getting a Quit Claim Deed. He knew he didn't 
4 have perfect title. But with that Quit Claim Deed he 
5 investigated everything he could on the property and in the 
6 record and had a title company help him and they couldn' t find 
7 anything. The property was just, it's either that the property 
8 was supposed to sit dormant or does the law require you to go 
9 beyond looking at the property itself and the owners and the 
10 records and go beyond the other county records and look and I 
11 think the case (inaudible) that's not a requirement. You're 
12 not required to do that and that doesn't place you on inquiry 
13 notice. I think that's what Judge Pueller ruled. 
14 There are a couple of other things in the brief that 
15 I want to talk about real quickly, just so that the Court is 
16 not misled. The county said there were red flags placed in the 
17 county recorder's Office. If there were red flags they 
18 certainly were there long after Dr. Richards and his title 
19 company examined the records. They would have come much later 
20 on and I think that's also undisputed. 
21 This property is landlocked by the county line, the 
22 property, if you look on there you can't really tell but it 
23 goes up a very steep hill. The county line is right at the top 
24 of the hill. But if you look at the Point of the Mountain as 
25 you come across it, it gets down to 1-15 and then it still has 
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1 the same size hill on the other side of 1-15. It dips down. 
2 So this property is enclosed in a pit or an area. Even when 
3 it was initially purchased, that's all owned by Metro West now 
4 and the only way to get into it is through Metro West property 
5 where there are large signs posted saying this is Metro West 
6 property. 
7 The same thing occurred at the time that Tingeys 
8 owned it. To get into the property you had to go through the 
9 Tingeys' property past their farm house to get into this 
10 enclosed area. 
11 (Inaudible) the county, in this case, made a mistake. 
12 They didn't file in the right location. Its argument is despite 
13 the fact that we made this mistake you couldn't have had good 
14 faith. They don't have evidence of bad faith. The requirement 
15 is good faith. Did they have good faith? Dr. Richards when he 
16 bought this piece of property, they said you couldn't have had 
17 good faith because you didn't go beyond the county records and 
18 beyond the property and beyond the Tingeys and look over in 
19 Salt Lake County. So you must have had bad faith. Well, I 
20 don't think the facts bear that out. It's undisputed what they 
21 did when Judge Pueller found that sufficient as a matter of 
22 law. 
23 Just real briefly on adverse possession. The 
24 requirements are seven years of ownership under a written 
25 J instrument. Now the written instrument in this case is a Quit 
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1 Claim Deed. They don't dispute that. They don't dispute the 
2 seven years. We had a ten year period of ownership. For the 
3 first time in their reply brief, they questioned the issue that 
4 came in the past and only stated, well, when we looked at the 
5 records that they presented to us. There is some cryptic codes 
6 on there and we can't really understand what Utah County meant 
7 in those cryptic codes. Dr. Richard testified and it's 
8 undisputed below. In the briefs they didn't set forth any 
9 facts or any documents disputing the payment of taxes. He 
10 testified he paid all taxes. He submitted duplicate county 
11 records that came in a package. Metro West recorded this 
12 property as soon as they bought it and they were taxed on it. 
13 They are trying to raise a problem with that now but it was 
14 never disputed below and it really isn't disputed now. The 
15 taxes were paid on this property and that's the undisputed 
16 testimony. 
17 Well, the final requirement is was there possession. 
18 Now, possession requires one of two things in this case. Did 
19 they improve the property? That's one. Or did they use it in 
20 the ordinary course of their business? I went back just over a 
21 weekend to look at the undisputed facts. And really the facts 
22 are, again, undisputed. The county never set any foot on this 
23 property during this entire time period. They don't know what 
24 happened on this piece of property. The only testimony about 
25 what happened comes from Dr. Richards and it's in the record 
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1 and it's undisputed. He testified that they bulldozed several 
2 roads across this property. That's undisputed. That's an 
3 improvement to the property to bulldoze several roads across 
4 it. They did it so they could bring heavy equipment on it. 
5 Drills and front-end loaders that would excavate the dirt so 
6 they could test for the soil. They repeatedly brought this 
7 heavy equipment on from 1990 forward. They continually sampled 
8 the property for sand and gravel and took sand out of the 
9 property. They incorporated the property into their 
10 surrounding gravel pits. It was all a part of their company. 
11 They used it exclusively. No one had access to this property. 
12 It was designated by signs. The only way to get to it, as I 
13 said, is through Metro West's property. It was part of their 
14 gravel pit operation. 
15 They recorded their interest so everyone else had 
16 notice that they claimed to be the owner of the property. They 
17 paid taxes on the property and they maintained it as private 
18 property. They did all of these things and the county claims, 
19 Well, that's just not enough. They don't dispute the fact they 
20 just say it's not enough. Well, it clearly is. 
21 In the Cooper case the Utah Supreme Court said 
22 grazing your sheep for three weeks out of a year for seven 
23 consecutive years is sufficient to bring an adverse possession. 
24 So, in this case Dr. Richards testified that they were all over 
25 J this piece of property. They put a lot of roads across it. 
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Did many other things to establish their presence on the 
property as part of their gravel pit operation. The county 
3 J doesn't dispute that in any way. 
4 Now, the county argues public use. It tries to say 
5 that this falls under the statute because if the property has 
6 been designated for public use - and I would just ask the Court 
7 to look at the record because I remember it very distinctly. 
8 Pick up (inaudible) deposition of the county, an older 
9 gentleman who is now retired, Roger (inaudible), and I asked 
10 him this, "Has the property been designated for public use?" 
11 And he said, "Well, no." He said "But we did have some 
12 discussions about maybe having a trail system on this piece of 
13 property." 
14 THE COURT: But wouldn't that be a little weird for 
15 Salt Lake County to have a trail system in Utah County? 
16 MR. CLEMENTS: Yes. I asked him that and I said, 
17 "Well, tell me about these discussions." And he said, "Well, 
18 they were very, very preliminary." Then I asked him again, 
19 "Well, explain to me about these discussions." And I remember 
20 he got mad at me and he said "I told you there were no 
21 discussions about the property, someone just brought up let's 
22 make a trail system and then, then we discarded it 
23 immediately." I said "Do you have any documentation of any of 
24 any of this?" He said no. 
25 The law is pretty clear. It has to be designated for 
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1 a specific public use. In this case a brief discussion after 
2 the lawsuit was filed about maybe having a trail system where 
3 they couldn't document it all and then their own witness said, 
4 we just immediately discarded does not, it does not mean that 
5 property has been designated for public use. Metro West gained 
6 access to the property pursuant to the recording statutes 
7 (inaudible). It also gained access by adverse possession. 
8 Unless they are any questions, I'll submit on that 
9 (inaudible). 
10 THE COURT: (Inaudible) we'll give you two minutes. 
11 MR. HANSEN: Briefly, your Honors. First of all, just 
12 responding to a couple of items. In the statements about the 
13 Tingeys being longstanding owners that if they were family 
14 farmers, that's the first I've only heard of that. I only knew 
15 that there was a claim according to the deposition testimony 
16 that the property had been the family for a number of years. 
17 As to having a farm house or as to having a family farming 
18 operations there, all of this is new, this is testimony in 
19 effect (inaudible) county said this is not (inaudible) and 
20 shouldn't be considered in that respect. 
21 The same thing goes to the discrepancy regarding the 
22 thousand foot variance, all of this, the only testimony is that 
23 there was an alleged discrepancy in the legal description. The 
24 section markers and the some thousand foot variance and so 
25 forth is all testimony by counsel this morning. 
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1 As is the same to the purchase price not being 
2 inadequate. There is no evidence about the adequacy of the 
3 consideration in this case. And as Judge Green would hit on 
4 what is really the focal point of this case and that is that 
5 this case openly comes to with respect to the recording act 
6 the (inaudible) for them to purchase it in good faith but that 
7 is extensively an issue for a jury. It's a question of state 
8 of mind. It's a question of whether their curiosity reasonably 
9 should have been excited to the point of putting a (inaudible) 
10 inquiry and whether or not they exercised diligence in their 
11 inquiry, if any inquiry was made at all. 
12 Counsel, again, harped on the notion that Metro West 
13 went as far as they could go in their inquiry and found no 
14 interest asserted by a third party. That is simply not enough. 
15 That is, again, we have the title examiner defines the 
16 (inaudible) interest in Salt Lake County on a very personal 
17 inquiry just by looking for a land pattern with the BLM and he 
18 certainly was able to do that. 
19 Again, counsel says that there is no evidence of bad 
20 faith. I think there seems to be an onerous assumption here 
21 that it is the county's duty to provide evidence of bad faith 
22 on the part of Metro West. We believe that under the recording 
23 statute the burden is on the party seeking the protection of 
24 the recording statute to establish that they acted in good 
25 faith and (inaudible) very, very serious fact questions here 
22 
1 and, in fact, maybe there is sufficient evidence as a matter of 
2 law for the Court to conclude that they did not act in good 
3 faith because the evidence of their grantor's infirmity of 
4 title is there right in their faces. With that, your Honor, 
5 we'll submit. Thank you. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Your argument has 
7 been very helpful in an interesting case. We'll take in under 
8 advisement and let you know as soon as possible. 
9 I (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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